The battle of Jena-Auerstädt
(14 October 1806)
The story of the double battle of Jena and Auerstädt, one of the proudest pages in our regimental history.
The story of the double battle of Jena and Auerstädt, one of the proudest pages in our regimental history.
When the Tsar (after not ratifying the Treaty of Pressburg) and the King of Prussia re-opened hostilities with France in 1806, Napoleon decided to take out the Prussians before the Russians could come to their aid. So he sent the Grande Armée, from its quarters North of the Danube, into the rear of the Prussian forces that were advancing to the West. On the 5th of October he set the tone for the campaign, with the following remark: 'Each general, each officer, each soldier must consider this war as an affair of honour, as a duel to which the Prussian Army is provoking the Grande Armée.'
On 6th October, the Emperor was at Bamberg, where the 3rd Corps (that the 85ème was part of) acclaimed him, and where Marshal Davoût himself inspected his regiments. On the 12th, the 3rd Corps was at Auma, where it received the order to march to Naumburg 'as fast as it was able' at about 5.30. This was a march of a good 50 kilometres (well over 30 miles), 'a sacred bagful'. The halts were suppressed; they ate and they slept, while marching. The men certainly groaned, but on the 13th, at about 9 o'clock, the whole of 3rd Corps was stationed around Naumburg, with Gudin's division (with the 12ème, the 21ème, the 25ème and the 85ème) two kilometres from the bridge of Koesen on the Saale.
In the afternoon, Marshal Davoût made a personal reconnaissance beyond the river in the direction of Apolda, as this was where he had to go the next day, as 3rd Corps mission was covering the right flank of the manoeuvre conceived by the Emperor. Napoleon was convinced that he had in front of him the greater part of the Prussian Army, on the heights of Jena. Reality was completely different, however…
At Jena, Napoleon only had a secondary detachment commanded by Hoehenlohe in front of him, while further to the north, at Auerstaedt, Davoût would bump into the Duke of Brunswick, at odds of three to one, a balance of forces which seemed to leave little chance to the French.
Fortunately, the Marshal had a strict conception of duty. He had been ordered to go to Apolda, so that’s where he would go - whatever the forces seeking to bar the route to him. For the want of anything better, he would be killed with the 3rd Corps in the defile of Koesen, in order to give the Emperor the time to move up. It is necessary to say that he believed in the fortune of his arms, like all the great captains, and that he felt himself supported by his divisional commanders, who have been described by Napoleon as 'characters of Aces'. They were Morand, Friant and Gudin, his colleagues at Brienne, who had been called 'honest and clever, just and gentle'.
As for the regiments - they were well trained at the camp of Bruges, and weren't scared at all at facing the shock of the famous cavalry of the King of Prussia. The artillerymen sang, 'Ah the good companion; he has fired the cannon well,' while the infantrymen formed square, as they had done at drill, thousands of time before, with as much calm as rapidity.
At 6.30, 14th October 1806, Gudin's division crossed the bridge of Koesen, before approaching the steep slope which came out on to the edge of the plateau of Hassenhausen. A thick fog reduced visibility to less than the range of a pistol. At the head of the column marched Gautier's Brigade (25ème and 85ème Ligne), accompanied for scouting by a squadron of the 1er Chasseurs a Cheval. Beyond Hassenhausen, this advanced guard contacted that of Brunswick. Davoût was informed at 7 o'clock.
At the start of play, the battle took on the character of an encounter battle, two opposing adversaries, whose men were at one point or another over about ten kilometres. Once on the plateau, Gudin's division pushed back the first enemy elements. It occupied Hassenhausen, and deployed to the North of the village, which was going to become the pivot of Davout's manoeuvre.
At 8.45, Schmettau's division deployed in front of Gudin, and Blücher, who had gathered twenty squadrons, charged wholeheartedly and 'without ceasing', the French right, where the squares of the 25ème and 21ème stayed unshakable. Davoût animated and encouraged them, while the beautiful Prussian cavalry exhausted itself in efforts as useless as tiring, because the slopes to the North of Hassenhausen obliged them to carry out their charges whilst climbing.
The fog now lifted and Friant's division arrived at this moment. Davoût engaged them to the right of Gudin. The 108ème de Ligne seized Spielberg, and the Marshal now moored his line onto the two moles constituted by the built up areas of Hassenhausen and Spielberg.
At 9.30, the Prussian attack developed, and Wartenleben's division outflanked Hassenhausen, held only by the 85éme. Submerged by the mass of assailants, the latter disengaged, but succeeded in forming a square behind the village, thus halting the progress of Irwing's dragoons. The situation, meanwhile, stayed critical, because the pivot of the defence was about to collapse. Davoût came up, and threw the 21ème into the village, which was not again occupied by the enemy, while the 12ème supported the 85ème.
At the Prussian side, Scharnhorst replaced Schmettau, who had been wounded. Brunswick continued his pressure against Hassenhausen, but then two blows of destiny simultaneously changed the direction of the struggle. Brunswick was mortally wounded, and the 13ème Légère, at the head of Morand's division arrived on the plateau. It was 10.30. Led by Davoût himself, the 13ème fell upon the enemy, relieved Hassenhausen, while Debilly's Brigade (51ème and 61ème Ligne) re-established the French line to the south of the village.
Prince Wilhelm sent against Morand all the squadrons he could find. These could only mill around his squares, which were animated by Davoût, whose hat and uniform were pierced by balls. In his turn, Prince Wilhelm was gravely wounded, and he ceased to have any effect on his decimated, exhausted, unusable cavalrymen.
Shortly after 12 o'clock, Morand's division passed to the attack on the enemy right wing, which gave way. The movement of retreat, thus started, degenerated into a general retirement, and at 2 o'clock, Davoût was on the attack on his whole front. The enemy retreat degenerated into a rout.
Towards 4 o'clock, one of the two reserve divisions of the Prussian army having made a front to the East of Eckartsberga, was tumbled by a detachment of 400 men of the 12ème and 21ème Ligne. Davoût at last halted his divisions, worn out by more than nine hours of uninterrupted combat. The Army of Brunswick in an indescribable disorder, went and mixed itself with that of Hoehenlohe, beaten at Jena.
Pursued without respite, the Prussian corps were unable to pull themselves together. They were rolled up, and all the fortresses capitulated without resistance. On the 25th October, Davoût, followed by his 3ème Corps, crossed into Berlin in the midst of an immense crowd. On the 26th, the Emperor, in the heart of Prussia, officially congratulated the Marshal and his subordinates.
Official history separates the two battles called Jena and Auerstaedt. For the combatants of 1806, there was only one battle, conducted by one chief, the 'Shorn One' (le Petit Tondu), and executed by the different corps of the Grande Armée. It is in this way that Fourrier Ferdinand Doignon, of one of the companies of grenadiers of the 21ème Line, recalled it in his correspondance, as also in his 'Journal de Campagne', that he was at Jena, where he had his musket shattered in his hand 'by bullet or a grapeshot' (canister). Nowhere does he mention the name of Auerstaedt.
(source: Bertain, 'Histoire du 21ème Régiment d'Infanterie', 1992)